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Targeting target shareholders
Abstract
We integrate heterogeneity and uncertainty in investor valuations into a model of takeovers.
Investors have dispersed valuations, holding shares in rms they value more highly, and a
successful o¤er must win approval from the median target shareholder. We derive the con-
sequences for an acquiring rms takeover o¤er its size and cash/equity structure and
implications for takeover premia, rm returns, share price dynamics, the probability that a
takeover succeeds and shareholder welfare. We characterize when the acquirer prefers cash
o¤ers, and when equity o¤ers are best. Our model collectively reconciles various empirical
regularities that have proven elusive to explain in one unied framework, and we derive new
testable predictions.
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1 Introduction
Heterogeneity in beliefs, derived utility, tastes, etc. is a pervasive characteristic of many
economic settings. Our analysis focuses on nancial markets, where such heterogeneity is
manifest: di¤erent investors attach very di¤erent valuations to stocks, and some investors
value their shares in a rm far above the market price.1 We explicitly integrate such investor
heterogeneity into a theory of takeovers, building an equilibriummodel that accounts for het-
erogeneous investors on both sides of the acquisition. We investigate how the management
of an acquiring rm should design its takeover bid its size and cash/equity structure in
light of its own private valuations, deriving the consequences for takeover premia paid, tar-
get and acquiring rm returns, likelihood of successful takeovers, post-takeover o¤er share
price dynamics, and social welfare changes created by a takeover. Our model reconciles a
broad set of empirical regularities, shedding light on some features of corporate acquisitions
that are otherwise di¢ cult to reconcile with existing theories, and it generates several new
testable implications.
In our model, a potential acquirer develops a synergy with a target rm and would thus
gain from acquiring it. An acquisition o¤er consists of either an amount of cash in exchange
for a target shareholders ownership interest, or an equity stake in the joint (merged) rm. To
succeed, a takeover o¤er must win approval from a majority of shareholders. If the majority
agrees to sell their shares, the target is absorbed by the acquirer, becoming a single entity.
We capture the existing lack of consensus about a rms value by assuming that di¤erent
shareholders and management hold di¤erent private valuations of their rms. This is in the
spirit of the literature on disagreement and di¤erences of opinion between investors (see
Harris and Raviv, 1993 or Morris, 1996), and the large asset pricing literature that inte-
1Anecdotes indicating this can be drawn from messages on various nancial chat rooms:
I would rather see PolyMedica Corporation (PLMD) continue to operate as a stand-alone company than
be taken over by something BIG in the near future. A takeover premium of lets say 20% would certainly
be nice, but its game over for us as stockholders in PLMD.... I have more faith in management producing
higher returns than that!" 15-Feb-06 03:41 am. Yahoo Message Board.
 PLMD closed at $43.43 on February 15, 2006. On August 28, 2007 Medco Health Solutions announced
it would buy PLMD in an all-cash deal worth $1.5 billion. The purchase price valued PLMD at $53 per
share, a 22% premium for that (presumably) disappointed shareholder.
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grates heterogeneity of investorsbeliefs with collateral or leverage constraints (e.g., Fostel
and Geanakoplos, 2014, Simsek, 2013) to study asset price dynamics.2 An implication of
this work is that, in equilibrium, investorsmarginal utilities (i.e., private valuations) for
holding assets di¤er across both shareholders and non-shareholders.3 In fact, institutional
investors often sharply disagree over what a rms future earnings and, hence, future share
prices will be. One manifestation of this is the radically di¤erent one-year target share prices
set for the same stock by analysts for di¤erent institutional investors.4
A rms share price is determined by the private valuation of its marginal shareholder,
who values the rm the least among all shareholders. However, a successful takeover o¤er
must win approval from the median target shareholder, who attaches a higher valuation to
the rm when shareholders disagree over their rms value. This e¤ectively endows target
shareholders with bargaining power: because successful takeover o¤ers must be at a premium
over the extant share price, the marginal shareholder extracts signicant rents. Consistent
with this prediction, takeover premia are often high even when there is no evidence of other
interested buyers who might engage in a bidding war (see Andrade et al., 2001, or Betton
et al., 2008, for a survey; Fishman, 1988, provides an early theoretical treatment).
We go beyond this simple prediction to analyze the acquiring rms choice of whether to
use cash or equity in its takeover bid. Unlike cash o¤ers, equity o¤ers require an acquiring
rms manager to cede some of his private valuation for his rm, but allow target sharehold-
ers to retain greater stakes in the target and, thus, more of their private valuations. That is,
equity o¤ers mandate a transfer of private values from the acquiring rms management and
2Similarly, Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) and Chabakouri (2013) introduce heterogeneity in risk aversion
and collateral constraints. Osambela (2015), building on Gallmeyer and Hollield (2008), shows how
feedback e¤ects of funding illiquidity, disagreement, and market liquidity can reconcile empirical features of
liquidity and nancial asset prices (see also Xiong and Yan, 2015). These papers share our starting point
investor heterogeneity but focus on asset pricing implications rather than the market for corporate control.
3Miller (1977), Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002), and Bagwell (1991) also employ frameworks based on
di¤erences of opinion to study issues related to shareholder ownership and tendering decisions.
4Inspection of share price targets reveals that for larger rms (e.g., with market caps exceeding $50
Billion), which are potential acquirers, the range of price targets is roughly 35-40% of their share prices; and
for smaller rms with market caps between $100 million and $6 billion that are potential targets, the range
of disagreement over price targets typically exceeds the outstanding share price. Papers that document
upward-sloping supply curves for shares (i.e., heterogeneity in investor valuations) in takeover contexts
include Bagwell (1992), Bradley, Desai and Kim (1987) and Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2007).
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shareholders to target rm shareholders. The optimal means of payment therefore hinges on
the private valuation of the acquirers manager relative to the median target shareholders
cash is optimal when the acquirers manager has a relatively high private valuation, while
equity is optimal when his private valuation is low relative to that of the median target
shareholder. Our prediction on the means of payment therefore emphasizes the contrast in
private valuations of management at the acquirer and the median shareholder at the target.5
We establish that the return to the combined rm in a cash acquisition is at least as high
as that in an otherwise identical equity acquisition. We then show that an acquirers stock
price can fall following an optimal equity o¤er, but not after an optimal cash o¤er. This re-
ects that the interests of the acquiring rms management and its shareholders are aligned
for cash o¤ers, but not necessarily for equity o¤ers. That is, management and shareholders
value cash similarly, so a cash o¤er that appeals to an acquirers manager also appeals to
its shareholders. In contrast, with heterogeneous valuations, an acquirers manager values
equity o¤ers di¤erently from its shareholders, and when the managers private valuation is
lower than those of shareholders, he may make an equity o¤er that acquirer shareholders do
not like. Indeed, since equity o¤ers are attractive to an acquirers manager precisely when
his private valuation is lower than the median shareholders at the target rm, a decline in
the acquirers stock price upon a successful equity o¤er is a likely outcome.
We also show that the combined acquirer-target return in an equity acquisition can be
negative even when synergies are positive. The intuition reects that pre-merger, investors
hold the rms they value most, but when rms merge, investors must hold both rms, dilut-
ing their claims to their preferred rms. Building on this intuition, we show that the return
on the combined rm is a poor proxy for shareholder welfare that typically overstates welfare
gains or understates welfare losses. This welfare bias reects that combined rm returns do
not capture the greater dilution losses of shareholders with higher private valuations.
5Gorbenko and Malenko (2014) also study the choice of the means of payment cash or equity in the
context of a rm being auctioned to competing bidders. They suppose that an acquirers synergy with the
target is private information. This makes it costly for a high-synergy bidder to separate from a low-synergy
bidder via equity o¤ers since the cash-equivalent value is higher for a high-synergy bidder. As a result,
bidders only use equity when cash constrained. In contrast, our model features no private information, and
di¤erences betwen cash and equity are driven by investorsheterogeneous valuations.
3
We then investigate the implications of the fact that a targets share price only reveals
the private valuation of its marginal shareholder, leaving uncertainty about the median val-
uation. We show that if synergies are high then increased uncertainty about this median
valuation i.e., greater uncertainty about how high an o¤er must be to succeed causes an
acquirer to raise its o¤er in order to reduce the likelihood of a rejection that would lead to
the synergies going unrealized. If, instead, synergies are small, increased uncertainty leads
the acquirer to reduce its o¤er, since low o¤ers are more likely to be accepted, and hav-
ing an o¤er fail is less costly. Thus, whether greater uncertainty about target shareholder
valuations raises or reduces o¤ers hinges on the size of synergies.
A corollary of these ndings is that o¤ers sometimes fail even when synergies are large
enough that both the median target shareholder and the acquirer could benet from an
acquisition. Likewise, takeover bids may be rejected by target shareholders even though
they understand that rejection will reduce their share price relative to what would obtain if
they approve the o¤er. We predict that a targets share price should always rise following
a takeover o¤er that is possibly attractive to its median shareholder. The targets share
price will rise further if a takeover succeeds, reecting the benecial resolution of takeover
uncertainty, but fall if it fails. By contrast, an acquirers share price will move in the same
direction after a successful takeover as it moved after the announcement of the takeover
o¤er. If, instead, a takeover o¤er fails, both share prices will return to their original levels.
Our paper makes two main contributions: First, we provide an intuitive way to think
about the stylized facts of takeovers that is based on a feature investor heterogeneity that
is recognized to be an important component of nancial markets. This perspective allows
us to rationalize a large set of stylized facts. Importantly, our model generates testable pre-
dictions that distinguish it from the literature on corporate takeovers motivated by moral
hazard or asymmetries of information (see Betton, et al., 2008, for a survey).
For example, Andrade et al. (2001) nd that market reactions to an acquirers cash acqui-
sitions are positive, but those to equity acquisitions are mostly negative.6 In our setting, this
6So, too, Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) nd that around acquisition announcements,
acquiring-rm shareholders lose 12 cents per dollar spent on acquisitions.
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possible drop in market assessment of the acquirer reects lower private valuations of man-
agement than shareholders and hence misaligned interests in equity o¤ers shareholders care
more about the dilution of their claims to their preferred rm following an equity takeover.
Acquirer returns can be negative when the synergies driving an acquisition are too small to
overcome this misalignment (as long as the o¤er does not require acquiring rm shareholder
approval, as is the case for most equity o¤ers in the US). Theories based on moral hazard
argue that the acquirers share price may decline because the acquiring rms manager may,
for example, pursue value-reducing mergers in order to derive private benets of control. To
the best of our knowledge, such models do not have the di¤erential implications between
equity and cash o¤ers that arise naturally in our model due to shareholder heterogeneity.
Asymmetric-information-based theories can also reconcile the decline in an acquirers
share price after an equity o¤er. In essence, an acquirer makes an equity o¤er when its CEO
has private information that his rm is overvalued, and the equity o¤er reveals the assessed
overvaluation. As a result, the acquirers share price could fall due to the bad news re-
vealed even though the equity o¤er is in the best interests of its shareholders. However, the
subsequent predicted share price dynamics di¤er from ours: asymmetric-information-based
theories predict that, as long as synergies are positive or target shareholder approval reects
a positive assessment by target shareholders, an acquirers share price should rise when an of-
fer is accepted and fall when a takeover fails. Findings in Savor and Lu (2009) are consistent
with our model but not with asymmetric-information-based models: after an announcement
that a takeover failed for exogenous reasons, the acquirers share price rises, returning on av-
erage to the price when the takeover was rst announced. Moreover, our model can reconcile
the ndings of Becht, Polo, and Rossi (2014) that an acquiring rms share price rises after
equity o¤ers that require approval from its shareholders, but that it falls when approval is
not required. In contrast, asymmetric-information-based arguments would not predict such
a rise in the acquirers share price when acquiring rm shareholder approval is required.
Rather than solely being wealth destruction, our model suggests that the observed
negative acquirer and combined acquirer-target returns just reect what happens to the val-
uations of marginal shareholders. Relatedly, we can reconcile the more nuanced prediction
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of a diversication discountfound by Berger and Ofek (1995), Lamont and Polk (2001),
and Graham et al. (2002) mergers between less-related rms are associated with lower
returns. In our setting, the diversication discount arises naturally because shareholder
valuations di¤er by more when the target and acquirer come from less-related industries,
implying greater loss from dilution of shareholder valuations.
Our second key contribution is to provide novel insights into the market for corporate
control. Our model provides a structure for endogenizing the choice of how a takeover is
nanced, and the consequences of this decision. It also provides a new perspective on the
welfare consequences of acquisitions and derives new testable implications about how out-
comes are a¤ected when an acquirer is more uncertain about the median target shareholders
valuation. In addition, we provide fresh insights into why the combined acquirer-target re-
turn in a cash acquisition exceeds that in an equity acquisition. Our model suggests that a
key driver of this empirical regularity is the interaction of two asymmetries a size asymme-
try (the acquirer is larger than the target in most takeovers) and an ownership asymmetry
(the joint rm is held entirely by acquiring rm shareholders just after a cash acquisition,
whereas it is held jointly by shareholders from both rms in an equity acquisition). We then
derive the novel empirical implication that ceteris paribus, the di¤erence in the combined
acquirer and target returns between cash and equity acquisitions should rise with the size
di¤erence between the acquirer and the target. In sum, many predictions of our model
are unique and stem largely from the simple premise that shareholders value their shares
di¤erently. This suggests that models incorporating such heterogeneity can help researchers
better understand the dynamics of the takeover process.
Our paper is not the rst to study the implications of heterogeneous shareholder val-
uations for acquisitions. Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2007) and Chatterjee, John,
and Yan (2012) o¤er empirical analyses of stock market reactions to takeovers that are
motivated by informal models featuring heterogeneous shareholder valuations. Focusing on
bidding rms, Moeller et al. (2007) argue that greater diversity of opinion about a bidders
prospects leads to a steeper downward-sloping demand curves for its stock, resulting in lower
announcement returns following its equity o¤er. Focusing on target rms, Chatterjee et al.
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(2012) appeal to heterogeneity to justify a downward sloping demand curve for their shares,
for which they nd empirical support. Both of these papers reect an increasing interest in
using di¤erences of opinion to explain takeover returns, and help explain some important
underlying patterns. Our model goes beyond these analyses to provide a rigorous theoretical
analysis. We incorporate investors on both sides of the takeover simultaneously, taking into
account that with heterogeneous investors, not only do a rms shareholders disagree on
their rms value, but shareholders also have higher valuations than non-holders, reect-
ing that investors hold stocks they deem undervalued. We build an equilibrium model
in which we derive equilibrium prices via market-clearing conditions, taking into account
the valuations, wealth dynamics, and optimizing behavior of all parties to derive takeover
outcomes and to distinguish between cash and equity o¤ers. This formal modeling delivers
a rich set of new implications that allow us to distinguish models based on heterogeneous
valuations from competing theories.
We next present the model, and analyze optimal equity and cash o¤ers. We then study
which type of o¤er the acquiring rm nds optimal, and derive the consequences for market
reactions. In Section 4 we present a number of novel (and testable) empirical predictions, and
analyze how the extent of uncertainty about the median shareholders valuation a¤ects o¤ers,
probability of success, and share price movements following announcement and shareholder
vote. Appendix A contains additional details of the analysis. Appendix B contains all proofs.
2 Base Model
Firms and Investors. The economy features a potential acquirer rm A and a potential
takeover target T . We normalize each rm to have one share outstanding. Our base model
focuses on two groups of risk-neutral investors who di¤er in their private valuations for the
two rms. One group of investors consists of types A 2 [0;1) who place values VA+ A on
rm A and VT on rm T ; the other group of investors consists of types T 2 [0;1) who place
values VT + T on rm T and VA on rm A.7 Thus, Vj represents a common component
7Our assumption that all acquiring-rm shareholders value the target at VT and all target shareholders
value the acquirer at VA is designed to capture the fact that even within narrowly-dened industries (e.g.,
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of valuation of rm j, and i is an incremental private valuation that this investor type
attaches, raising his total valuation of rm j to Vj + i.8
We assume that an investor can invest any amount in any rm(s) up to the amount
of wealth that he holds (or equivalently, up to some maximum amount that the collateral-
constrained investor can borrow). The limited access to capital means that the highest valu-
ation investor does not hold the entire rm, giving rise to a downward sloping demand curve.
The marginal shareholder in rm j is the one with the lowest private valuation j: all
individuals with higher private valuations are fully invested, and all those with lower private
valuations do not hold the rm. Firm js trading price reects that its marginal shareholder
is indi¤erent between holding and selling,
Pj = Vj + j; j = A; T . (1)
For each j 2 fA; Tg, we denote the cumulative wealth of type j investors with private
valuations of at least j by ~Gj (j).9 In Appendix A we show how j is pinned down by ~Gj
via market clearing, and we provide a su¢ cient condition on ~Gj for this private valuation
to be strictly positive (i.e., j > 0), which we assume holds throughout our analysis.
Firm js trading price does not reveal the exact form of ~Gj () save for what is revealed
by market clearing. As a result, the acquiring rm is typically uncertain about the median
target shareholders private valuation, T . We denote the distribution over 

T conditional on
the information in the market-clearing price PT by FT (), with associated support [lT ; hT ],
where T < 
l
T  hT . Because a takeovers success requires median target shareholder ap-
proval, FT () captures the relevant uncertainty faced by an acquiring rm about whether a
particular o¤er will succeed.10
biotechnology), few investors have positive private values for any given pair of rms. We later relax this
structure so that some investors have positive private valuations of both rms.
8We do not model the tradeo¤s between risk and return that enter the market value of an asset through
the valuation terms VA and VT for the acquirer and target that are common to all investors. This is consistent
with the takeover literature that takes the current price as given rather than trying to derive it as the present
value of future cash ows, embedding the risk and return tradeo¤ into the discount factor. The heterogeneity
comes from the additional term A or T , and reects heterogeneous opinions of investors about a rms value.
9Letting ~Gj () converge to place all mass at j = 0 for j 2 fA; Tg recovers the case with no disagreement.
10All results in Section 3 hold regardless of the specic form of FT (): In particular, they hold when FT
is degenerate (i.e., when the acquiring rm knows the median target shareholders valuation).
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Acquirer Management. Like its shareholders, the acquiring rms management has a
positive private valuation of rm A, attaching value VA + MA , where 
M
A > 0. We interpret
VA+ 
M
A as the managers assessment of his rms long-term value. The manager values the
target at VT . We assume that the manager maximizes the long-term prots of shareholders
based on his assessment of the rm value, or alternatively, the manager has an equity stake
in the rm and maximizes his own prot.
Timing. The sequence of events is as follows. At t = 0, a synergy S > 0 develops between
rms A and T . The synergy S is public information and the valuation of the joint rm is
additive for all investors. Thus, a type A investor values the joint rm at (VA + A)+VT+S.
At t = 1, the acquiring rms management makes an o¤er. At t = 2, target shareholders
decide whether to accept or reject the o¤er. The o¤er is accepted if and only if at least
50% of target shareholders vote in favor. We assume that following a favorable vote, there
is a freeze-out of non-tendered shares, and the target is absorbed by the acquirer. This as-
sumption mirrors general practice freeze-outs occur in over 90% of US and UK takeovers
(Gomes, 2001) in order to eliminate free riding.
Discussion. Our model structure is designed to capture two key dimensions of valuation
heterogeneities. First, j represents the di¤erence between how the marginal shareholder of
rm j values rm j and how shareholders in other rms value rm j: it measures the extent
to which shareholders of the two rms di¤er in their valuations of their respective rms.
Such heterogeneity in valuations is a straightforward implication of models with di¤erences
of opinion (i.e., agreeing to disagree), where shareholders form di¤erent posterior valua-
tions of nancial assets even after information is aggregated via the trading process. Taking
this heterogeneity as a primitive allows us to eschew complications arising from Bayesian
updating while still incorporating the fundamental components of such frameworks.
Second, the di¤erence T   T in the valuations of the median and marginal target share-
holder is the key measure of dispersion in valuations among target shareholders, and it
drives the o¤er premia. Empirical researchers often use the dispersion in analyst forecasts
of one-year-ahead earnings to measure heterogeneity in investor beliefs (Moeller et al., 2007,
Chatterjee et al., 2012). Researchers may also be able to use the information in one-year-
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ahead share price targetsset by institutional analysts to obtain a proxy for T   T . For
example, as a proxy for T , one could use the median of those price targets that exceed the
outstanding share price (as these institutional investors are plausible shareholders).
Importantly for the ability of our model to deliver the takeover premia found in the data,
the variation in share price targets and earnings forecasts is high relative to the share prices
of potential takeover targets. For example, for moderate-sized biotech rms, the range of
price targets often exceeds a rms stock price. The implied large di¤erences in private
values mean that our model can reconcile the magnitudes of o¤er premia found in the data.
To ease analysis, we assume that the takeover opportunity is unexpected. What mat-
ters is that it is not fully anticipated. Market responses to takeover announcements make
clear that this is the relevant scenario share prices would not move were a takeover fully
anticipated. If the market attaches a positive probability to a takeover, then the pre-merger
share prices account for it, reducing the magnitudes of the predicted return e¤ects, but not
otherwise altering their qualitative properties. For work that considers the possibility that
share prices may rise in anticipation of a takeover, see Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012).
3 Analysis
We collect all assumptions on parameter values below. Most results are established under
a strict subset of the assumptions. In particular, if we say a result is established under A3,
it means the result assumes that A3 holds, but we do not require A1 or A2. So, too, if we
do not explicitly state any of A1, A2, or A3, then the result holds without their structure.
A1: The private valuation of the marginal shareholder in the acquiring rm A is nonde-
creasing in VA.
A2: The marginal acquiring rm shareholders private valuation exceeds the marginal tar-
get shareholders: A  T .
A3: The median target shareholders private valuation always exceeds the private valuation
of the marginal acquiring rm shareholder: lT  A.
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Assumption A1 delivers an unambiguous interpretation of rms with larger market cap-
italization: they have larger private and common value components. This assumption is
used for some comparative static results and facilitates interpretation.
To understand the economic rationale for Assumption A2, note that two possibly con-
icting factors a¤ect the relative magnitudes of A and T . First, empirically, the acquiring
rm is typically larger by a factor of three or more. This scale e¤ect suggests that, consistent
with A1, the marginal private valuation of the acquiring rm shareholder should be larger,
i.e., A > T . Possibly o¤setting this to some extent, the percentage of total assets that are
intangible, a primary source of disagreement among investors and analysts, may be higher
for target rms than acquiring rms. For example, in the pharmaceutical industry, targets
are often small biotech rms developing drugs of unknown value. What Assumption A2
says is that the scale e¤ect dominates the greater percentage of intangibility in determining
the magnitudes of private valuations. Indeed, a simple investigation of pharmaceutical rms
indicates that while on a per dollar basis the extent of dispersion in analysts forecasts of
earnings is higher for smaller rms that are likely targets, the absolute (total) dispersion in
analyst forecasts is much greater for larger rms. Still, even though A2 (A  T ) holds in
most takeover settings, it may not hold in all scenarios. We will provide intuition on how
this condition is used to reconcile some of the stylized facts in takeovers, and we will also
provide a qualitative discussion of what can happen when T is su¢ ciently larger than A.
Assumption A3 is not essential for our results it is made for analytical ease and is
useful in the context of equity acquisitions (see Lemma 1).
We start our analysis by examining equity and cash o¤ers when the payment method
(equity or cash) is exogenously determined. We then endogenize the method of payment.
Exogenous Equity O¤ers. In an equity o¤er, an acquirer o¤ers I newly-created shares of
the joint rm in exchange for all of the target shares. We denote the valuation of the target
shareholder who is indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting this o¤er by (I). Without
loss of generality, we focus on (I) that lie between the lower and upper bounds on the
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median target shareholders private valuation,
lT  (I)  hT , (2)
because an o¤er where (I) exceeds hT always wins, and thus is dominated by o¤ering I
0
such that (I 0) = hT ; and o¤ering I such that (I) is less than 
l
T always loses, and is thus
equivalent to o¤ering I 0 such that (I 0) = lT .
If a takeover fails, the payo¤ of the shareholder with private valuation (I) is VT + (I).
If the takeover succeeds, then just after a successful equity o¤er, trade will occur if A 6= T .
We denote the private valuation of a marginal shareholder in the joint rm by ~J , where
the tilde highlights that its realization will hinge on the realized distributions of shareholder
wealth distributions, ~GA() and ~GT (), via the market-clearing condition. The payo¤ of a
shareholder with private valuation (I) following a successful takeover depends on the value
of ~J , which, via the indi¤erence condition that equates the payo¤s following successful and
unsuccessful takeovers, yields a relationship between ~J , (I) and I. Appendix A provides
details on this relationship and on the market-clearing condition that determines the private
valuation of the marginal shareholder of the joint rm, ~J . The key features that emerge
from that analysis that we exploit are: (i) ~J must lie between the private valuations of the
acquirer and targets marginal shareholders, A and T , i.e.,
min fA; Tg  ~J  max fA; Tg ,11 (3)
and (ii)
I  VT + (I)
VA + S
. (4)
To understand (4), note that just after an equity acquisition but before equilibrium is
reached the per-share payo¤of a target shareholder with private valuation (I) is VT+VA+S+(I)
1+I
I.
If (I) < ~J , then this target shareholder will derive an additional benet by selling his shares
at the market price, which reects ~J ; and since ~J exceeds (I), it is the source of an added
benet. Therefore, his post-takeover per-share payo¤ satises
E >
VT + VA + S + (I)
1 + I
I. (5)
11The inequalities are strict if A 6= T and the total measure of j over the interval
(min fA; T g ;max fA; T g) is strictly positive for j 2 fA; Tg.
12
If, instead, (I)  ~J , then a target shareholder with private valuation (I) will hold the joint
rm and derive no additional benet. Then, equation (5) holds as an equality. Combining
these two scenarios yields
E  VT + VA + S + (I)
1 + I
I. (6)
Equation (6) and the indi¤erence condition that E equals the target shareholders pre-
takeover per-share payo¤ of VT + (I) give
VT+VA+S+(I)
1+I
I  VT + (I), which yields (4).
The following lemma provides a su¢ cient condition under which the indi¤erent target
shareholder holds the joint rm (i.e., (I)  ~J):
Lemma 1 Under A3 (lT  A), for any equity o¤er that satises (2), the indi¤erent target
shareholder will hold the joint rm. That is, (4) holds with equality.
We next examine what happens after a successful o¤er, which is an o¤er that satises
(2) and is accepted by a majority of target shareholders. After a successful equity o¤er, the
joint rms market value reects the value attached by its marginal shareholder:
gMV J = VT + VA + S +~J = PT + PA + S +~J   A   T . (7)
Because ~J  max fA; Tg (see (3)), an upper bound for the last four terms in (7) is:
S +~J   A   T  S +max fA; Tg   A   T
= S  min fA; Tg . (8)
Thus, the (random) market value of the joint rm, gMV J , is always less than the sum of
the two rmspre-merger valuations, PT + PA, whenever the synergy is small relative to
the minimum of the marginal shareholdersvaluations, min fA; Tg. This upper bound has
implications for the combined return from holding equal positions in the acquirer and target:
~RE =
gMV J
PT + PA
  1 = PT + PA + S +~J   A   T
PT + PA
  1 = S +~J   A   T
PT + PA
. (9)
Result 1 The combined acquirertarget return ~RE following an equity acquisition is nega-
tive if the synergy S is less than min fA; Tg.
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Here, min fA; Tg is a measure of the extent to which shareholders of the two rms
di¤er in their valuations of their respective rms. Result 1 says that the combined return is
negative if the synergy is less than this measure of the heterogeneity in valuations between
the shareholders of the two rms. This result reects that a merger forces investors to hold
rms they may otherwise not hold, diluting their claims to their favorite rms.
Next note that because ~J  min fA; Tg, a lower bound obtains for the combined
return. Using
S +~J   A   T  S +min fA; Tg   A   T (10)
= S  max fA; Tg , (11)
we have a su¢ cient condition on synergies for the combined return to be positive:
Result 2 The combined acquirertarget return ~RE following an equity acquisition is positive
if the synergy S exceeds max fA; Tg.
The share price of the joint rm is:
~PJ =
gMV J
1 + I
=
VT + VA + S +~J
1 + I
. (12)
Interpreting ~PJI as the cash equivalent of the equity o¤er, we have:
Proposition 1 Under A2 (A  T ), any successful equity o¤er has a cash equivalent that
is at a premium over the targets market value: ~PJI > PT .
A takeover dilutes a target shareholders claim to the target he now only has a claim
of I
1+I
to his private valuation T for which he must be compensated. This dilution a¤ects
every target shareholder, but the resulting loss is more severe for the median target share-
holder than the marginal shareholder. When the median target shareholder is indi¤erent
between accepting and rejecting, the marginal target shareholder must be strictly better o¤.
To understand the role of A2, suppose that A = T . Then, by (3), the marginal target
shareholder is also the marginal shareholder in the joint rm. Hence ~PJI, which is the value
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of the equity o¤er from the perspective of the marginal shareholder in the joint rm, is also
the o¤ers value from the perspective of the marginal target shareholder. Since, as estab-
lished above, the marginal target shareholder is strictly better o¤, it follows that ~PJI > PT .
Now suppose that A > T . Then, by (3), the marginal shareholder in the joint rm has a
higher private valuation than the marginal target shareholder, further raising ~PJI relative to
PT . If, instead, A2 is violated, so that A < T , then (3) implies that the joint rm is priced
by someone who values it less than the marginal target shareholder, i.e., A < ~J < T . If
T is su¢ ciently greater than A so that ~J is su¢ ciently less than T , this may o¤set the
more generous o¤er made to win median target shareholders approval, reversing the result.
This discussion reveals that Proposition 1 holds even when A2 does not hold, as long as
A is not too much smaller than T . Furthermore, even on the uncommon occasions where
A is much smaller than T , Proposition 1 may still hold when the underlying sources of dis-
agreement move the components of heterogeneous valuations about the target in the same
direction. That is, when the marginal target shareholders valuation rises relative to non-
shareholders, the median target shareholders valuation is also likely to diverge from the mar-
ginal target shareholders valuation. Thus, when T >> A, the median target shareholder
is also likely to have a far higher private valuation than the marginal target shareholder,
forcing the acquiring rm to make a more generous o¤er to win approval, raising ~PJI.
Noting that ~PJI is also the targets stock price after a takeover, Proposition 1 implies:
Result 3 Under A2 (A  T ), in a successful equity o¤er, the targets return RT = I ~PJ PTPT
is always positive.
In contrast, the acquirers return after a successful equity takeover,
~PJ PA
PA
, is negative
if synergies are su¢ ciently small. Under the simplifying condition A3 (the median tar-
get shareholders private valuation exceeds marginal acquiring rm shareholders private
valuation), we provide a su¢ cient condition for the acquirers return to be negative:
Result 4 Under A3 (lT  A), in any successful equity o¤er, the acquirers return is neg-
ative if S < A.
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Intuitively, when the median target shareholders private valuation is high, a large pre-
mium must be o¤ered, which results in a negative return for the acquirer. More generally,
the acquirers return is always negative when the synergy is positive but su¢ ciently small.
Thus, our model can reconcile the negative returns for acquirers that Moeller, Schlingemann,
and Stulz (2005) nd. Further, the combined return is negative when the synergy is small
(Result 1), even though the targets return is always positive (Result 3). These results will
hold when we endogenize the acquiring rms optimal o¤er.
Exogenous Cash O¤ers. With a cash o¤er, the acquirer o¤ers cash C to target share-
holders in exchange for all of their shares. Immediately after a successful cash acquisition,
the joint rm is held only by the acquiring rms shareholders, while all previous tar-
get shareholders hold cash. Then, since type A and T investors value the joint rm at
VA + VT + S  C + A and VA + VT + S  C + T respectively, any target shareholders with
private values T > A will purchase claims to the joint rm from marginal acquiring rm
shareholders. This transaction results in a new marginal holder of the joint rm, one with
a higher private valuation. Therefore, the share price of the joint rm will satisfy
~PJ > VA + VT + S   C + A. (13)
Rearranging (13) yields ~PJ + C > VA + VT + S + A. Hence, provided that A  T , the
combined return is
~RC =
~PJ + C
PA + PT
  1 > VA + VT + S + A
PA + PT
  1 = S   T
PA + PT
=
S  min fT ; Ag
PA + PT
 ~RE,
where ~RE is the combined return in an equity o¤er and we have used equations (8) and (9).
Summarizing, we have:
Result 5 Under A2 (A  T ), ceteris paribus, the combined acquirer and target return in
a cash acquisition exceeds that in an equity acquisition.
Result 5 shows that under A2, the combined acquirer and target return in a cash acqui-
sition exceeds that in an equity acquisition. This result is a consequence of two e¤ects, an
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asymmetry e¤ectand a cash e¤ect.Just after a successful cash o¤er (but before the equi-
librium is reached), the joint rm is held entirely by the original acquiring rm shareholders,
whose private valuation is at least A. In contrast, after a successful equity o¤er, the com-
bined rm is held jointly by the original acquiring and target rm shareholders, and the valu-
ation ~J of the marginal holder of the joint rm is between A and T (see (3)). When A > T ,
the private valuation of the marginal holder of the joint rm just after a cash o¤er is higher
than after an equity o¤er. The cash e¤ect reects that cash acquisitions provide the original
target shareholders with new funds that allow them to purchase claims to the joint rm from
original acquiring rm shareholders. This e¤ect further drives up the price in a cash o¤er.
The above two e¤ects go in the same direction, making the combined return higher in cash
than in equity acquisitions.12 This result can explain the empirical nding that, on average,
the combined returns in cash o¤ers exceed those in equity o¤ers (Andrade et al., 2001).
It is instructive to examine these two e¤ects more closely. The asymmetrye¤ect shows
that the interaction of two asymmetries a size asymmetry (the acquirer is larger than the
target in most takeovers, the foundation of assumption A2) and an ownership asymmetry
(the joint rm is held entirely by acquiring rm shareholders just after a cash acquisition,
whereas it is held jointly by shareholders from both rms in an equity acquisition) is
important for explaining the di¤erence in the combined return between cash and equity ac-
quisitions; our model indicates that this asymmetry e¤ect is a key driver of the empirically-
observed di¤erences in the acquirers return between cash and equity o¤ers.
This asymmetry e¤ect also implies the following novel empirical prediction:
Implication 1: Under A1 (monotonicity), ceteris paribus, the di¤erence in the combined
acquirer and target return between cash and equity acquisitions should rise with the di¤er-
ence in the sizes of the acquirer and the target.
The cashe¤ect suggests that to the extent that a cash o¤er relaxes budget constraints
of investors, some of the empirically-observed di¤erences in an acquirers return between cash
12In obtaining Result 5, we have implicitly assumed that the acquirer has the cash required to make the
acquisition. If, instead, the acquirer pays out its cash to its shareholders e.g., via a dividend and then
conducts an equity acquisition, the presence of higher-valuation investors in the market who now have
available cash will drive up the joint rms price, counteracting the negative e¤ects in an equity acquisition.
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and equity o¤ers may reect interactions between investorsincreased supply of cash and
heterogeneous valuations. This cash e¤ect is likely second order in practice. In particular,
it is dominated by the asymmetry e¤ect whenever the acquirer is far larger than the target.
We now examine target shareholderswillingness to accept an o¤er. We let (C) denote
the private valuation of the target shareholder who is indi¤erent between accepting and
rejecting a cash o¤er of C. As with equity o¤ers, one can focus on (C) lying between the
lower and upper bounds of the median target shareholders private valuation,
lT  (C)  hT , (14)
because a cash o¤er such that (C) exceeds hT always wins, and thus is dominated by o¤er-
ing C 0 such that (C 0) = hT ; and o¤ering C such that (C) is less than 
l
T always loses, and
is thus equivalent to making an o¤er such that (C 0) = lT .
Just after a successful cash o¤er one that satises (14) and is accepted by a majority of
target shareholders former shareholders of the target for whom VA+VT +S+ T  C > ~PJ
wish to buy shares in the joint rm, while original shareholders of the acquiring rm for
whom VA+ VT + S + A C < ~PJ want to sell. Market clearing determines the price of the
joint rm, ~PJ . There are two possible scenarios:
(i) If VT+VA+S C+(C)~PJ > 1, then (C) exceeds the private valuation of the marginal share-
holder of the joint rm. Thus, a target shareholder with private valuation (C) derives an
added benet by holding C~PJ shares of the joint rm for each share he originally held in the
target, receiving a per-share payo¤of (VT + VA + S   C + (C)) C~PJ > C from the takeover.
(ii) If VT+VA+S C+(C)~PJ  1, then (C) is less than the private valuation of the marginal
joint rm shareholder. A target shareholder with private valuation (C) will not hold the
joint rm, hence gaining no additional benet, so his post-takeover per-share payo¤ is just C.
As the o¤er C leaves the target shareholder with private valuation (C) indi¤erent be-
tween accepting and rejecting, the indi¤erence conditions for these two scenarios yield:
VT + (C) =
VT + VA + S   C +  (C)
~PJ
C if
VT + VA + S   C +  (C)
~PJ
> 1 (i) (15)
VT + (C) = C otherwise. (ii)
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Equation (15) (i) reveals that if the marginal joint rm shareholder has a lower private
valuation than the indi¤erent target shareholder, then C < VT + (C), i.e., the cash o¤er is
less than the indi¤erent target shareholders valuation. The indi¤erent target shareholder
uses the cash received for his shares to purchase shares in the joint rm at its market price.
As the marginal joint rm shareholder who determines this price has a lower private valua-
tion, this purchase provides the indi¤erent target shareholder with an added private benet,
making him willing to tender at a lower price (as are all shareholders with lower valuations).
Even when the indi¤erent target shareholder holds the joint rm (Lemma 2 of Appendix
A provides su¢ cient conditions for the indi¤erent target shareholder to hold/not hold the
joint rm), so that C < VT +  (C), Proposition 2 below shows that the o¤er must still
exceed the target rms pre-acquisition price, PT = VT + T , as long as the acquirers mar-
ket value is high enough. This is because when the joint rm is expensive, the indi¤erent
target shareholder only purchases a small claim, so the added private benet received is
small. Thus, to make him indi¤erent, a premium relative to the pre-acquisition price must
be o¤ered. Indeed, as the acquirers market value grows arbitrarily larger than the targets,
the o¤er approaches VT + (C):
Proposition 2 Under A2 (A  T ), in a successful cash o¤er, the o¤er represents a pre-
mium if the acquirer is su¢ ciently larger than the target. In particular, if either PA > 2PT
or VA + S > PT , then
PT < C  VT + (C): (16)
Further, as the acquirers market value grows arbitrarily larger than the targets value, the
o¤er approaches the pre-acquisition value of the indi¤erent target shareholder, VT + (C):
lim
VT+
h
T
VA
!0
C   (VT +  (C)) = 0. (17)
Corollary 1 Under A2, the targets return is positive in a cash acquisition if either PA >
2PT or VA + S > PT .
Boone and Mulherin (2007) report that the median ratio of the target-to-bidder equity
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value is only 0.27. Andrade et al. (2001) and Moeller et al. (2004) document that the ac-
quirer is especially likely to be much larger in cash acquisitions. Thus, Proposition 2 and
Corollary 1 apply to most cash acquisitions.
Assumption A2 (A  T ) plays a key role in Proposition 2 for the same reason it is
important to ensure there is a premium with equity. Were all target shareholders to have
the same private valuation (T ), and A = T , there would be no premium, i.e., PT = C.
Since, in fact, most shareholders have private valuations greater than T , the o¤er has to be
raised to appeal to them, generating a positive premium. However, if A << T , then the
cash o¤er can be less generous because the indi¤erent investor with private valuation (C)
can use the cash to purchase shares at a low price from acquiring rm shareholders who
place a far lower value on the joint rm.
3.1 Optimal Payment Method
We now let the acquirer choose the type of o¤er cash, equity, no o¤er to make.13 We
rst examine an acquiring rm managers willingness to make an equity o¤er. Prior to a
takeover, his per-share payo¤ is AM = VA + MA ; if an o¤er I is accepted, his post-merger
per-share payo¤ is VT+VA+S+
M
A
1+I
. Thus, the managers expected per-share payo¤ is
EAM (I) = Pr((I)  T )
VT + VA + S + 
M
A
1 + I
+ Pr((I) < T )
 
VA + 
A
M

], (18)
where Pr((I)  T ) is the probability that o¤er I is accepted since (I) is the private
valuation of the indi¤erent target shareholder given o¤er I, and T is the realization of the
median target shareholders valuation.
The optimal o¤er I maximizes EAM , trading o¤ between the probability of winning and
the size of the payo¤ when a takeover succeeds. That is,
I = argmax
I
EAM (I) :
If, instead, the acquirer makes a cash o¤er C, then its managers expected per-share
13In practice, an acquirer may not always be able to choose between cash or equity o¤ers; for example,
nancial constraints may mandate equity o¤ers. Our main results extend to those situations.
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payo¤ is
CAM (C) = Pr((C)  T )
 
VT + VA + S + 
M
A   C

+(1  Pr((C)  T ))
 
VA + 
A
M

], (19)
where (C) is the private valuation of the indi¤erent target shareholder given o¤er C. As
with the optimal equity o¤er, the optimal cash o¤er C maximizes CAM , trading o¤ between
the probability of winning and the size of the payo¤ when a takeover succeeds:
C = argmax
C
CAM (C) .
The choice between cash and equity boils down to whether CAM (C
) > EAM (I
), in
which case a cash o¤er is made, or CAM (C
) < EAM (I
), in which case an equity o¤er is
optimal. Finally, if CAM (C
) = EAM (I
) = AM , where AM is the managers per-share
payo¤ prior to the takeover, then the acquirer optimally makes no o¤er.
Cash and equity have competing merits. Equity o¤ers require an acquiring rms man-
ager to cede some of his private valuation for his rm. This works in favor of using cash, and
further favors cash as the managers valuation of his rm, MA , increases. Conversely, equity
o¤ers allow target shareholders to retain stakes in the target and thus some of their private
valuations. This works in favor of using equity since the retention of the private valuations
by target shareholders allows the acquirer to make a relatively lower o¤er, an e¤ect that
rises with the median target shareholders valuation, T . One additional secondary e¤ect
may also arise and a¤ect the o¤er choice. If the indi¤erent target shareholder (1) does not
hold the joint rm in an equity o¤er, or (2) holds the joint rm in a cash o¤er, then he
could derive an additional benet by (1) selling his shares in an equity o¤er, or (2) using
the available cash to purchase claims to the joint rm in a cash o¤er. This would allow the
acquirer to reduce its o¤er, making that o¤er type more attractive.
The resulting choice of means of payment depends on how the private valuation of the
acquirers management compares to that of the median target shareholder, and how the
private valuation of the marginal holder of the joint rm compares to that of the indi¤erent
target shareholder (which a¤ects the occurrence of the additional benet):
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Proposition 3 (i) If (a) the acquirer managers private valuation always exceeds the me-
dian target shareholders (i.e., if MA  hT ), and (b) following the optimal equity o¤er, the in-
di¤erent target shareholder holds the joint rm (for which Lemma 1 provides a su¢ cient con-
dition), then the acquirers manager prefers to make a cash o¤er, i.e., CAM (C
)  EAM (I).
(ii) If, instead, (a) the median target shareholders private valuation always exceeds the
acquirer managers, i.e., if MA  lT , and (b) following the optimal cash o¤er, the median
target shareholder does not hold the joint rm (a su¢ cient condition for which is hT  A),
then the acquirers manager prefers to make an equity o¤er, i.e., EAM (I
)  CAM (C).
The proposition provides su¢ cient conditions for equity or cash o¤ers to be made. Quite
generally, however, cash is always optimal if the acquiring managers private valuation is
su¢ ciently high relative to the median target shareholders; and equity is always optimal
when the reverse is true. That is, the key determinant for the means of payment is how the
acquiring managers private valuation compares to that of the median target shareholder,
with cash o¤ers becoming more attractive as MA increases. To gain intuition, consider a
simple case in which the median target shareholders private valuation T is known with
certainty and the median target shareholder derives no additional benets (from purchasing
or selling the joint rm) in both optimal cash and optimal equity o¤ers (e.g., if A = T and
T is su¢ ciently close to T ). Then, regardless of whether equity or cash is used, the acquir-
ing rms optimal o¤er leaves the median target shareholder indi¤erent between accepting
and rejecting the o¤er. Thus, the acquiring rms management prefers cash to equity if
and only if the sum of its per-share payo¤ plus the per-share payo¤ of the median target
shareholder is higher with cash. Equity and cash o¤ers di¤er in their impacts on the loss
of private valuations in a merger. With equity, the acquirer holds a fraction 1
1+I
of the
joint rm and the target holds the remaining fraction I
1+I
. Hence, the total loss of private
valuation with an equity o¤er is I
1+I
MA +
1
1+I
T . In contrast, the loss with a cash o¤er is 

T .
Thus, the loss with the equity o¤er is greater if and only if
I
1 + I
MA +
1
1 + I
T  T , MA  T ,
which is exactly the condition from the proposition.
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Existing theories (e.g., Chatterjee, John, and Yan, 2012) predict that a manager wants
to use equity when the market overvalues his rms equity. Proposition 3 is consistent with
such theories in that it shows that equity is preferred when an acquirers private valuation is
low relative to its marginal shareholders private valuation A (i.e., its equity is overvalued).
However, our analysis provides additional insights, showing that the choice between cash
and equity should also reect the private valuations of target shareholders: equity is pre-
ferred to cash when the acquiring rms manager has a low private valuation relative to the
median target shareholder. Thus, the targets market value, as determined by its marginal
shareholder, does not directly enter this calculation.
Proposition 3 establishes that the acquirer is more likely to use equity if its managers
private valuation for his rm is lower. Empirically, one can interpret the acquiring rms
manager as its CEO. Provided that a managers shareholding in his rm rises with his
private valuation, we can use the managers stake to proxy for the valuation, yielding the
following testable prediction:
Implication 2: The smaller is an acquirer managers holding of his company, the more
likely the acquirer is to o¤er equity.
3.2 Stock Price E¤ects of Optimal O¤ers
Having derived how an acquiring rms manager designs optimal o¤ers, we now characterize
the stock price consequences. We rst observe that, given su¢ cient conditions that describe
most takeovers, target shareholders receive positive returns after both equilibrium cash and
equity o¤ers.
Proposition 4 (i) Under A2 (A  T ), a target rms share price always rises following
an equilibrium equity o¤er;
(ii) Under A2 and PA  2PT (or VA+S > PT ), a targets share price always rises following
an equilibrium cash o¤er.
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This result is a direct corollary of Propositions 1 and 2, which provide su¢ cient condi-
tions for target shareholders to receive positive returns from optimal equity and cash o¤ers.
We now contrast this result with what acquiring rm shareholders may experience.
Proposition 5 (i) If the acquirer managers private valuation is less than the marginal
shareholders (MA < A), the synergy is less than min fA; Tg, and A2 (A  T ) holds, then
the acquiring rms share price falls following an equilibrium equity o¤er, i.e., ~PJ < PA.
(ii) An acquiring rms share price always rises after an equilibrium cash o¤er.
Thus, an equity o¤er that is optimally chosen by the acquirer manager may succeed,
and yet cause the acquirers stock price to fall. Intuitively, if the acquirer management has
a lower private valuation than its shareholders, it means that the shareholders care more
about the dilution associated with an equity o¤er. To succeed an equity o¤er must be
generous enough to win approval from the median target shareholder. Such an o¤er may
fail to leave enough to compensate the marginal acquiring rm shareholder for the dilution
to his private valuation when the synergy is too small but when MA < A, the acquiring
rms manager may be willing to make the equity o¤er. Indeed, equity o¤ers are especially
attractive precisely when MA is small.
In contrast, any cash o¤er that is individually rational for an acquiring rms manager
is also preferred by its marginal shareholder, implying that the acquiring rms share price
rises. Intuitively, all parties value cash in the same way. Hence, a cash o¤er that appeals to
the acquiring rms management also appeals to its shareholders. This result is consistent
with Andrade et al.s (2001) empirical nding that acquiring rmsshare prices tend to drop
following stock acquisitions, but not cash acquisitions.
We next establish that not only may the acquirers share price fall following an equilib-
rium equity o¤er, but it can fall by so much that the combined return is negative:
Proposition 6 (i) If the acquirer managers private valuation is less than the marginal
shareholders (MA < A) and the synergy is less than min fA; Tg, then the combined ac-
quirer and target return is negative following an equilibrium equity o¤er, i.e., RE < 0.
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(ii) Under A2 and PA  2PT (or VA + S > PT ) the combined return to the target and
acquiring rm is always positive following an equilibrium cash o¤er.
The result that the combined return is always positive following an equilibrium cash o¤er
follows directly from the results that the acquirer and target each experience positive re-
turns. The result that the combined return can be negative following an equilibrium equity
o¤er implies the previous result that the acquirers return can be negative.
Proposition 6 reveals that a negative combined return following an equilibrium equity
o¤er does not mean that synergies are negative. Rather, combined returns can be negative
even when synergies are positive because pre-merger, shareholders hold the rms they value
most, but post-merger, they must hold both rms, diluting their claims to their preferred
rms. In Section 3.3, we investigate aggregate shareholder welfare and its relationship with
the size of the synergy and the combined return.
The size of the lost value to an acquiring shareholder increases in his private valuation
and the extent of the dilution of his claim to that private valuation. If the private valuation
of the acquiring rms management is less than that of its marginal shareholders, the mar-
ginal shareholder may su¤er a loss when its managements payo¤ is positive, but su¢ ciently
small. Further, the attraction of equity o¤ers relative to cash o¤ers rises when MA is smaller
precisely because the acquiring rms management does not mind diluting its private valu-
ation by as much. Here, MA < A captures shareholders who attach higher valuations to the
rms assets than management.14 More generally, more extensive investor heterogeneity, as
captured by a larger value of A, can cause the acquiring rms share price to fall.
We conclude by comparing combined acquirer and target returns for equilibrium acqui-
sitions. Recall that when the payment method was exogenous and A  T , the combined
return in a cash acquisition exceeded that in an equity acquisition (Result 5). This result
extends when the acquiring rms manager selects his preferred payment method:
14Agency considerations (e.g., a managers empire building motives) could also lead to a decrease in the
acquirers return, just as when the managers private valuation di¤ers from target shareholders. However, a
di¤erence exists: a managers private benet of control does not vary with the payment method, so agency
considerations do not have the same di¤erential implications for the choice between cash and equity that
di¤erences between a managers private valuation and that of the median target shareholder do.
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Proposition 7 Consider two equilibrium takeovers in settings that are identical save for
the private valuation of the acquiring rms management MA , so that one acquisition is with
equity and the other is with cash. Under A2 (A  T ), the combined return in the cash
acquisition exceeds that in the equity acquisition.
Summarizing these results reveals that, consistent with empirical ndings, cash acqui-
sitions are associated with positive and higher returns than equity acquisitions, the target
experiences positive returns, but equity acquisitions can be associated with negative com-
bined acquirer-target returns, even when equity acquisitions are optimal.
Share Price Dynamics Over the Takeover Process. Following a cash o¤er, the targets
share price will rise to reect that the o¤er is at a premium over the targets stand-alone
price, and that with positive probability the median shareholders private valuation will be
low enough that the takeover succeeds. If the o¤er is accepted, the targets share price
will rise further to reect the benecial resolution of uncertainty from the perspective of its
marginal shareholder. However, if the median shareholders private valuation is higher, the
o¤er will be rejected, and the targets share price will fall to its pre-takeover value, VT + T .
Moreover, since a cash o¤er that appeals to the acquiring rms management also appeals
to its shareholders, following a cash bid the acquiring rms share price will rise to reect
the positive probability that the bid will succeed. The share price would rise further upon
acceptance, reecting the benecial resolution of takeover uncertainty from the perspective
of the acquirer; but fall to its level prior to the emergence of synergies whenever its o¤er is
rejected. Hence, we have the following testable predictions:
Corollary 2 Suppose that A2 (A  T ) and PA  2PT (or VA + S > PT ) hold. Then, the
share prices of both the target and acquiring rm rise when synergies emerge and a cash bid
is made, and rise further if the bid succeeds. Both rmsshare prices fall if the bid fails.
If, instead, an acquirer makes an equity bid rather than cash, the targets share price
exhibits similar dynamics. However, the acquirers share price dynamics are unchanged only
if synergies are high enough that a successful takeover results in positive acquirer returns.
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Otherwise, the acquiring rms share price will fall after an equity takeover bid, and fall
further if the takeover succeeds. This prediction is the opposite of that implied by takeover
theories based on asymmetric information: when an acquiring rm has private information
about its value, equity o¤ers would suggest that its stock is overvalued, so that its share price
could fall following an equity o¤er due to the bad news revealed. However, subsequently,
the acquirers share price should rise with approval as long as synergies are positive, or if
approval reects positive private target shareholder information; and it should fall when
takeovers fail due to any negative information revealed by the rejection about the acquirer
and the loss of synergies. In contrast, in our setting, if an acquiring rms stock price falls
following an equity o¤er and there is uncertainty over whether the o¤er would be accepted,
then it should fall further following acceptance, but rise following rejection.
It is di¢ cult to test these predictions directly due to the endogeneity and selection is-
sues associated with accepted and rejected o¤ers (for example, outside of our model, the
takeover negotiation process may feature the possibility of a subsequent o¤er if an initial
o¤er is rejected). An insight from Savor and Lu (2009) is that one can get clean identica-
tion by focusing on takeovers that fail for exogenous reasons, an approach that Masulis et
al. (2012) also employ. Then our model predicts that the acquirers share price should rise
back to its original level when the failure of a takeover is announced (as the transaction is
unwound). Consistent with our model, in the three day window around the announcement
of a takeovers failure, Savor and Lu (2009) nd abnormal acquirer returns of 3 percent,
which just o¤set the negative abnormal acquirers returns of 3 percent when a takeover with
equity was rst announced. These twin results provide strong conrmation of our theory.
3.3 Welfare E¤ects
In this section we examine the welfare consequences of mergers. With homogeneous valua-
tions, combined returns are a good measure of welfare gains or losses. However, the literature
also uses combined returns as a proxy for changes in social welfare in settings where investors
have heterogeneous valuations. Here, we take a closer look at the welfare consequences of
mergers. We show that with heterogeneous valuations the combined return ceases to be
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a good measure of welfare change, and that it typically overestimates welfare gains. For
simplicity, we focus on equity o¤ers (cash o¤ers have the same qualitative features).
To proceed, it is useful to calculate the fraction of (pre-merger) rm j held by type-j
investors with private valuations between j and j, for each j 2 fA; Tg. From equation
(26) in the appendix, this fraction is given by Lj (j) = 1   ~Gj(j)VA+j for j 2 [j;1), where
~Gj (j) is the cumulative wealth of type j investors with private valuations of at least j,
where Lj
 
j

= 0 and Lj (1) = 1.
Pre-merger, the total utility of all shareholders of the acquiring and target rms isZ 1
A
(A + VA) dLA (A)+
Z 1
T
(T + VT ) dLT (T ) = VA+VT+
Z 1
A
AdLA (A)+
Z 1
T
TdLT (T ) .
Just after the merger (before any subsequent trading), the total utility of these investors is
1
I + 1
Z 1
A
(S + A + VA + VT ) dLA (A) +
I
I + 1
Z 1
T
(S + T + VA + VT ) dLT (T )
= S + VA + VT +
1
I + 1
Z 1
A
AdLA (A) +
I
I + 1
Z 1
T
TdLT (T ) .
The di¤erence between these two measures represents the increase or decrease in social wel-
fare immediately after the merger. We write this change in social welfare as S 1, where
1 =
I
I + 1
Z 1
A
AdLA (A) +
1
I + 1
Z 1
T
TdLT (T ) . (20)
Recall that trade will occur after a successful equity o¤er if A 6= T . In equilibrium, the
private valuation of a marginal shareholder in the joint rm (~J) satises (3). The gains
from this trading increase social welfare. Denoting this increase by 2, we have
0  2 
(
I(A T )
I+1
if A  T
(T A)
I+1
if A < T
. (21)
To understand (21), suppose that A  T . The fraction of the joint rm held by the original
target shareholders with private valuations between T and A cannot exceed
I
I+1
. These
target shareholders trade with type-A investors with private valuations below A who had
not previously held the acquiring rm and hence have cash available for trade. It follows
that the gain in social welfare for each share traded cannot exceed A   T .
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The total change in welfare due to the merger is then
W = S  1 +2. (22)
We next characterize the relation between S andW in terms of model primitives. This will
prove useful for understanding the relationship between combined rm returns and welfare.
Result 6 S  max fT ; Ag  W  S  min fT ; Ag, where W is the total
change in social welfare and
 =
I
I + 1
Z 1
A
(A   A) dLA (A) +
1
I + 1
Z 1
T
(T   T ) dLT (T ) . (23)
Any increase in total shareholder welfare is always less than the size of the synergy. This
reects that, with heterogeneous valuations, a merger dilutes an investors holding of his
preferred rm, and the resulting loss of social welfare is too large to be compensated by the
welfare increase due to subsequent trading.
We next compare this change in welfare with a total rm return-based proxy, dened as
Wreturn = gMV J   PT   PA = S +~J   A   T , (24)
where gMV J is the market value of the joint rm dened in (7). We show that with heteroge-
neous valuations, this proxy incorrectly measures welfare, typically over-stating the welfare
gain (or underestimates the welfare loss), W . We rst derive a bound from (8) and (11):
S  max fT ; Ag  Wreturn  S  min fT ; Ag . (25)
Combining these bounds with Result 6 yields bounds on Wreturn  W :
Result 7  jA T j  Wreturn W  +jA T j, where  is dened in (23).
When jA   T j is small (see the discussion of Assumption A1 in Section 3), Result
7 shows that Wreturn over-estimates the welfare gains (understates the losses) from the
merger of W by about . Economically,
R1
j
 
j   j

dLj (j) in  is the di¤erence
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between the average private valuation of rm js shareholder and the private valuation of its
marginal shareholder. Empirically, this term could be estimated using the one-year-ahead
share price targetsset by institutional analysts: one could take the average of those price
targets that exceed the outstanding share price and subtract the outstanding share price
(and multiply by the number of shares outstanding).
Intuitively, the return-based proxy overestimates welfare gains because returns reect
changes in the utilities of the marginal shareholders, whereas the average shareholders have
higher private valuations and hence incur larger losses due to a mergers dilution of their
private valuations. As a result, total surplus may fall even if stock returns are positive; and
greater positive skewness in the distribution of private values in target rm shareholders
magnify these welfare losses.
Not only do heterogeneous valuations result in welfare losses that exceed those implied
by a combined return proxy, they also introduce ex-post ine¢ ciencies: due to the standard
freeze-out condition for non-tendering shareholders, target shareholders with high valuations
su¤er larger losses since these minority shareholders must take an o¤er that appeals to the
majority shareholders who su¤er less from the dilution in their private valuations. Such
losses are larger when the distribution of shareholder valuations is more positively skewed.
4 Comparative Statics
In this section, we derive testable implications related to an acquirers o¤er, its probability
of success, and share prices. To ease presentation and analysis, we add structure, assuming
that A = T  , and that the median target shareholders private valuation, T , is uni-
formly distributed on [^  ; ^+ ], where ^    > . The expected private valuation, ^,
of the median target shareholder measures the extent of heterogeneity in valuations for the
target rm between shareholders of the acquiring rm and those of the target rm; and 
measures the extent to which an acquiring rm is uncertain about the median target share-
holders private valuation. We focus on cash o¤ers; equity o¤ers have qualitatively similar
features. To avoid the complications in cash o¤ers when the median target shareholder
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derives private benets from holding the joint company, we assume that VT+^+
VA
<< 1, in
which case we can approximate this additional private benet as zero (see (17)).
Proposition 8 characterizes how the optimal o¤er and probability of success vary with
the primitive parameters:
Proposition 8 (i) As the mean private valuation ^ of the median target shareholders rises,
the optimal o¤er C increases, but the probability of acceptance falls.
(ii) As the value of the synergy S rises, both C and the probability of acceptance rise.
(iii) As the uncertainty  about the median target shareholders private valuation rises:
(a) if S < ^, then C falls, but the probability of acceptance rises; (b) if S > ^, C rst rises
and then falls, but the probability of acceptance always falls.
The result in part (i) that C rises with the degree of heterogeneity in private values of
target rm shareholders reects the intuition that a successful o¤er must win approval from
at least 50% of shareholders, who have higher valuations than the marginal shareholder who
determines the price. The result in part (ii) that C rises with the synergy S is also intuitive,
reecting that the opportunity cost of rejection rises in S. The reason why increased un-
certainty can cause an acquirer to reduce its o¤er, as illustrated in part (iii), is that greater
uncertainty raises the likelihood that low o¤ers are accepted; and when synergies are small,
the opportunity cost of having an o¤er rejected is small, making lower o¤ers optimal. If,
instead, synergies are large, there is a range where the o¤er initially rises in  because the
acquirer does not want to risk a failed o¤er. However, as the extent of uncertainty grows, the
only way to ensure success is to keep raising the o¤er, which eventually becomes too costly.
Beyond this point, the marginal increase in the probability that a higher o¤er succeeds is too
small to justify increasing the o¤er further, and the optimal o¤er C begins to fall with .
The optimal o¤er rises less than one-for-one with the median target shareholders ex-
pected private valuation ^, reecting that the acquirer trades o¤ between the amount paid
for a successful o¤er and the probability of success. Greater synergies induce the acquiring
rm to raise its o¤er, raising the probability it is accepted. To understand why the prob-
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ability of success rises with the extent of uncertainty  when synergies are small, observe
that when synergies are low, the realized valuation of the median target shareholder must
be low for the o¤er to be accepted, and a higher  raises this probability. In contrast, when
synergies are high, the probability of success falls with .15 This reects that with increased
dispersion in the median target shareholders possible valuation, it becomes more and more
costly for the acquiring rm to maintain a high acceptance probability, leading to a reduced
probability of success.
Parts (i) and (iii) of Proposition 8 can be viewed as providing foundations for Hypothesis
1 in Chatterjee et al. (2012), and extending it to consider the consequences of uncertainty
about the median target shareholders valuation. There are two key components to in-
creased target shareholder heterogeneity: (1) the di¤erence between the expected private
valuation of the median and marginal target shareholders, E[T ]  T , rises; (2) the extent 
of uncertainty about the median target shareholders valuation also rises. Chatterjee et al.s
(2012) intuition derives from the rst source. The premium in the optimal o¤er rises with
E [T ]  T to raise the likelihood that the median target shareholder accepts it, consistent
with their Hypothesis 1. However, part (iii) of Proposition 8 shows that greater uncertainty
about the median shareholders valuation can lower the o¤er premium when synergies are
low. This discussion suggests that there may be value added from estimation approaches
that include measures of synergies.
Our core model captures the observation that individual investors focus on a few stocks
and are unlikely to have positive private valuations in any given two stocks, by assuming
that an individual investor only has a positive private valuation of the target or the acquiring
rm. In practice, some investors may have private valuations of both rms. We now provide
a comparative static result that illustrates the qualitative consequences. We consider three
groups of investors: a fraction 1 
2
place values V +A on rm A and V on rm T ; a fraction
1 
2
place values V + T on rm T and V on rm A; and a fraction  place the same value
V + AT on both rms T and A. The fraction  of investors with positive private valuations
15When synergies are so high that the acquiring rm nds it optimal to make an o¤er that always
succeeds, the decrease is only weak the probability of success stays constant at 100%.
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of both rms captures the closeness of the two rms. For example,  may be higher when
the industries in which the rms operate are more similar.
When the distributions of A, T and AT are uniform and each investor has the same
wealth, our companion working paper establishes that (1) for all  < 1, the price of the
merged rm is at a discount from the sum of the two rms if the synergy is small enough (but
still positive); and (2) the magnitude of this discount rises as  decreases. Thus, our model
suggests why mergers between less-related rms tend to be associated with lower returns (see
e.g., Berger and Ofek, 1995, Lamont and Polk, 2001, or Graham et al., 2002) the fraction of
investors who views the two rms similarly and thus assign a positive private value to both
rms is smaller. Our core model delivers the intuition that this diversication discount
reects the di¤erences in valuations between target and acquiring rm shareholders of each
others rm, as a merger dilutes a shareholders holdings of his preferred rm. That is, a
greater diversication discount need not reect lower or more negative synergies, but rather
that shareholders in the two rms di¤er more substantively in their valuations of each others
rm. When some investors have positive private valuations of both rms, this intuition ex-
tends in that the diversication discount reects a measure of average di¤erences in valua-
tions between target and acquiring rm shareholders of each others rm. Moreover, presum-
ing that the magnitude of such di¤erences is larger when the two rms are from less-related
industries, our model predicts that the discount should be larger, consistent with the data.
5 Further Discussion
Approval of Acquirer Shareholders. Our model assumes that voting by shareholders
of the acquiring rm is not needed for the takeover to be e¤ected. This is consistent with
practice in the U.S., where shareholder voting on acquisitions is optional for cash deals,
and is only required for equity nanced deals when new share issuance exceeds 20% of an
acquirers outstanding equity. Moreover, even for these cases, Becht, Polo, and Rossi (2014)
observe that an acquiring rms management can circumvent this voting requirement by
funding the deal using less equity and more debt or cash.
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When acquiring rm shareholders must approve an o¤er, the o¤er must make the me-
dian acquirer shareholder better o¤. This has implications for the acquirers share price
after an equity acquisition. An equity acquisition dilutes acquirer shareholdersclaims to
the acquiring rm, generating losses of private valuation. Because the median acquirer
shareholders valuation exceeds the marginal shareholders valuation, if the median share-
holder gains from an acquisition, so does the original marginal shareholder in the acquiring
rm. For all practical purposes, this precludes the possibility that an acquirers share price
may fall after equity acquisitions that require acquirer shareholder approval, in contrast to
equity acquisitions that do not (to which Proposition 5 (i) applies).16 Becht, Polo, and Rossi
(2014) provide strong empirical support for this contrast. In the UK, shareholder voting is
mandatory for deals that exceed a relatively low valuation threshold, but is discretionary
below that threshold. Becht, Polo, and Rossi (2014) exploit this discontinuity to establish
that when approval is required, the acquiring rms share price rises by 8% on average,
but its share price falls when approval is not required.17 Importantly, private-information
based explanations predict the same decline in the acquiring rms share price following an
equity o¤er (which indicates that the acquiring rms management believes its shares are
overpriced), regardless of whether acquirer shareholder approval is required. Hence, this
evidence provides key support for our model.
External Financing. In establishing Result 5 and Proposition 7, we implicitly assume that
the acquiring rm has enough cash to make a cash acquisition. Here, we discuss what hap-
pens when the acquiring rm lacks cash, so that its cash o¤er is nanced by issuing equity.
First consider a benchmark setting of auctions, where the main friction is information
asymmetry between bidders and the seller (see Skrzypacz, 2013). In such settings, bidding
with cash and nancing entirely by equity issuance has the same revenue consequence as
16Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008) show that when institutional investors hold both sides of a transaction,
owning shares in both the acquiring rm and the target rm, they are more likely to vote in favor of the
acquisition when shareholder meetings at the acquiring rm call for such a vote. While our model does
not include shareholders who hold positions in both rms (see Section 4 for a discussion of this direction),
including such shareholders would be an interesting extension, and when such investors have similar private
valuations of the two rms, we can reconcile their ndings.
17Relatedly, Hsieh and Wang (2008) report that an acquirers share price is more likely to fall when acquisi-
tions are structured to bypass shareholder scrutiny by funding a deal with less equity and more debt or cash.
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bidding with equity; and if bidders can nance a cash acquisition by di¤erent means, a
pecking order obtains: bidders prefer to nance via internal capital to equity (Liu 2012).18
In contrast, in our setting, the key friction stems from heterogeneous valuations. As in
auction settings, paying with cash and nancing an acquisition entirely by equity issuance
leads to the same outcome as paying with equity.19 However, the implications for the peck-
ing order are di¤erent, reecting the di¤erence in underlying frictions. Proposition 3 reveals
that an acquirers preferred means of nancing hinges on the private valuation of its manager
vs. that of the median target shareholder internal cash is optimal when the manager has a
relatively higher private valuation, and equity nancing is optimal when the reverse holds.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we integrate heterogeneity and uncertainty in investor valuations of rms into
a model of takeovers, and study the choice between cash and equity o¤ers that are geared
toward maximizing the payo¤ of the acquiring rms manager. In equilibrium, share prices
are determined via market-clearing conditions and reect the valuations and optimizing be-
havior of all parties. These elements allow us to reconcile an array of empirical regularities
and provide new testable predictions. For instance, our model implies that combined target-
acquirer returns are higher after cash acquisitions than after equity acquisitions when the
method of payment is chosen optimally; that the di¤erence in the combined acquirer and
target return between cash and equity acquisitions should rise with the di¤erence in the sizes
of the acquirer and the target; and that CEOs of acquiring rms with greater shareholdings
should be more likely to use cash. We also derive implications for the patterns of share price
dynamics following successful and unsuccessful takeover o¤ers which can be distinguished
18If a bidder has to obtain post-auction nancing, he has incentives to signal high valuations by over-
bidding during the auction, which inuences post-auction nancing terms. Bidders dislike equity nancing
because signaling is costly. Moreover, if a bidder could nance by debt, then because debt nancing induces
smaller signaling incentives than equity nancing (the value of debt is less information-sensitive than the
value of equity), a bidders preferred means of nancing is rst internal capital, then debt, and nally equity.
19This equivalence presumes the market anticipates the subsequent equity issuance at the time of the cash
o¤er. We also assume the nancing is entirely by equity issuance; if, instead, the nancing is a mix of equity
and cash, then our qualitative results concerning the di¤erences between cash and equity acquisitions extend.
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from alternative theories, such as those based on asymmetric information.
An issue not analyzed here, but of empirical relevance, is the role of management at
the target rm. If target management has private information about target assets and can
make recommendations to shareholders about whether to accept or reject o¤ers, then its
own valuation for its rm can play an important role in these recommendations. Endoge-
nizing whether a merger o¤er is made based on the expectation of managerial support or
resistance to an o¤er would have implications for the probability of acceptance by share-
holders conditional on target managements endorsement (i.e., a merger) or resistance
(i.e., a hostiletender o¤er). Because recommendations reect both target managements
private valuation and its private information, target shareholders may not be able to fully
infer its managements private information from the recommendation given. This, in turn,
has implications for how the recommendation inuences shareholdersvoting decisions and,
ultimately, for how the acquiring rm structures its o¤er.
Another interesting aspect to consider is whether and when rms want to put themselves
in playand try to attract potential buyers. In line with a large literature on takeovers,
we take the possibility of an acquisition as given, arising due to synergies that materialize.
However, the study of when a rm wants to initiate a sale by approaching potential buyers
may be important to the extent that it speaks to the timing of acquisitions. Gorbenko and
Malenko (2014) study this in the context of a real option model where a seller has to decide
whether to approach possible buyers, or wait to be approached. We leave analysis of this
issue to the future.
One additional interesting aspect to consider would be how a rm decides to be an ac-
quirer for a specic target rm. In principle, one could imagine that some rms view them-
selves as potential buyers and search for reasonable targets. Such competition could deter-
mine the value of the synergy relative to other variables (to the extent that potential acquir-
ers may have heterogeneous synergies for a given target), as well as which rms or managers
see the deal as attractive from the perspective of giving away the least value in the acquisition
process, particularly in the case of equity acquisitions. Incorporating such an analysis raises
considerations that go well beyond the scope of this paper, and is left for future research.
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7 Appendix A
7.1 Model Foundations
Relation between wealth function and mass measure: For each j 2 fA; Tg, we denote
the measure of type j investors by Yj () : [0;1)! [0;Mj]; that is, Yj (j) denotes the mass
of those type j investors whose private valuations do not exceed j, andMj denotes the total
mass of all type j investors. The wealth function ~Gj () is related to type j investorsmeasure
by ~Gj (j) =
R1
j
Wj (z) dY (z), where Wj () denotes the wealth density of type j investors.
Market-clearing: Market clearing pins down the private valuation j of the marginal
shareholder of rm j:
Vj + j = ~Gj
 
j

. (26)
Equation (26) reects optimization by investors: they invest in neither rm if each rm
is deemed to be overvalued, or they invest all their wealth in the rm deemed to be most
undervalued. Thus, a type j investor invests all his wealth in rm j if j > j, and invests
in neither rm if j < j. From (26), if ~Gj(0) > Vj, then j > 0, and (1) and (26) give
Pj = ~Gj
 
j

, j = A; T . (27)
Median target shareholder valuation: The median target shareholders valuation T
solves ~GT (T ) =
1
2
~Gj
 
j

, which, by (26), is equivalent to
~GT (

T ) =
1
2
(VT + T ) . (28)
From equation (27), the trading price of rm j does not reveal the exact form of ~Gj ().
Thus, even conditional on observing the trading price, uncertainties may exist concerning
the form of ~Gj (), and hence on T , which is the solution for (28).
7.2 Exogenous Equity O¤ers
As Section 3 details, just after a successful equity o¤er, trade occurs if A 6= T . There are
two scenarios:
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(i) If (I)  ~J , then the median target shareholder will hold the joint rm, so his
post-takeover per-share payo¤ is E =
VT+VA+S+(I)
1+I
I.
(ii) If (I) < ~J , then the median target shareholder will not hold the joint rm. Instead,
he will sell his shares at the market price, which is determined by the marginal holder of
the joint rm, so his (random) post-takeover per-share payo¤ is E =
VT+VA+S+~J
1+I
I.
Summing over the two possibilities, we have
E =
VT + VA + S +max (~J ; (I))
1 + I
I.
Then the indi¤erence condition implies that (I) solves
VT + VA + S +max (~J ; (I))
1 + I
I = VT + (I). (29)
The value of ~J is pinned down by the market-clearing condition:
I
1 + I
 
1 
~GT (~J)
~GT (T )
!
(VT + VA + S +~J) = GA (~J)  ~GA (A) if A > T (i) (30)
1
1 + I
 
1 
~GA (~J)
~GA (A)
!
(VT + VA + S +~J) = ~GT (~J)  ~GT (T ) if T > A (ii).
To understand part (i) of (30), note that I
1+I
on the left-hand-side is the fraction of the joint
rm held by the original target shareholders,

1  ~GT (~J )~GT (T )

is the fraction of the original tar-
get shareholders who want to sell their holdings of the joint rm (these shareholders have
private valuations below ~J), and (VT + VA + S +~J) is the joint rms market value. Thus,
the left-hand-side is the total dollar amount that those original target shareholders (who wish
to sell) can sell for, which must equal the right-hand-side, which is the total wealth of those
type A investors who will buy the joint rm (these investors have private valuations exceed-
ing ~J). Part (ii) of (30) follows from a similar structure:
1
1+I
is the fraction of the joint rm
held by the original acquirer shareholders,

1  ~GA(~J )~GA(A)

is the fraction of the original ac-
quirer shareholders who want to sell their holdings of the joint rm, and (VT + VA + S +~J)
is the joint rms market value. Thus, the left-hand-side is the total dollar amount that
those original acquirer shareholders (who wish to sell) can sell for, which must equal the
right-hand-side, which is the total wealth of those type T investors who will buy the joint
rm. The system of equations, (29) and (30), jointly determine the values of I and ~J .
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7.3 Su¢ cient Conditions in Exogenous Cash O¤ers
Denote the upper bound of the support of private valuations for shareholders of the acquir-
ing rm by A. Lemma 2 identies su¢ cient conditions for the median target shareholder
to hold or not hold the joint rm:
Lemma 2 Dene ~FA (A)  1   ~GA()VA+A for all A 2 [A; A]. For any cash o¤er that satis-
es (14), if (VA + S) ~FA
 
min

lT ; A
	
> VT + 
h
T , the original median target shareholder
holds the joint rm, and C < VT + (C). If, instead, A > 
h
T , the original median target
shareholder does not hold the joint rm, and C = VT + (C).
Proof of Lemma 2: To prove the rst part of the lemma, suppose the conclusion is false,
i.e., that ~PJ  VT + VA + S   C + (C), so that C = VT + (C). After a successful cash
o¤er, original shareholders of the acquiring rm for whom VA+ VT +S + A C < ~PJ want
to sell their shares. The value of their shares is ~PJ ~FA(min f(PJ   VA   VT   S + C) ; Ag).
Substituting for ~PJ and C, the value of their shares is at least
(VT + VA + S   C + (C)) ~FA (min f(C); Ag) = (VA + S) ~FA (min f(C); Ag)
 (VA + S) ~FA
 
min

lT ; A
	
.
On the demand side, shareholders of the original target for whom VA+VT +S+T  C > ~PJ
wish to buy shares in the joint rm, and they have cash not exceeding C = VT + (C) 
VT + 
h
T to invest. Thus, equating total demand with the value of the shares supplied yields 
VT + 
h
T
  (VA + S) ~FA  minlT ; A	, contradicting the lemmas premise, thus establish-
ing the rst part of the lemma. The proof of the second part of the lemma is in the text. 
To understand the intuition for Lemma 2, note that ~FA (A) is the number of shares of the
acquiring rm held by investors with private valuation below A. The rst part of the lemma
essentially says that if the value of the synergies plus the market value of the portion of the
acquiring rm held by shareholders whose private valuations are less than the median target
shareholders is large relative to the targets market value, then ~PJ becomes high relative to
the cash that target shareholders receive. As a result, target shareholders do not purchase
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enough of the joint rm to drive its price up past the value to the original median target
shareholder. The second part of the lemma follows from (13): in the less plausible scenario
where the private valuation of the marginal holder of the acquiring rm always exceeds the
median target shareholders value, the median target shareholder will not hold the joint rm.
8 Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: By A3 and the fact that lT  T , (2) yields (I)  max fT ; Ag.
Then, by (3), we have (I)  ~J . The lemma follows. 
Proof of Proposition 1: The indi¤erence condition (29) yields
I
1 + I
=
VT + (I)
VT + VA + S +max (~J ; (I))
, (31)
which gives
~PJI =
VT + VA + S +~J
1 + I
I
=
VT + VA + S +~J
VT + VA + S +max (~J ; (I))
(VT + (I)) :
If ~J  (I), then ~PJI = VT+(I) > VT+T = PT , establishing the proposition. Now suppose
that ~J < (I). Since T  A, then because ~J is between T and A, we have ~J  T . Thus,
~PJI   PT = VT + VA + S +~J
VT + VA + S + (I)
(VT +  (I))  VT   T (32)
 VT + VA + S + T
VT + VA + S + (I)
(VT + (I))  VT   T
= VT + (I)  ((I)  T ) (VT + (I))
VT + VA + S + (I)
  VT   T
=
((I)  T ) (VA + S)
VT + VA + S + (I)
> 0,
establishing the proposition.
Proof of Result 4: By Lemma 1, (4) holds with equality. Substitute it into (12) yields
for the joint rms share price
~PJ =
VT + VA + S +~J
VT + VA + S + (I)
(VA + S) . (33)
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Note from equation (33) that ~PJ < VA + S (because (I) > ~J). Therefore, from equation
(1), if S < A, then ~RA =
~PJ PA
PA
< 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2: To prove the rst statement, suppose instead that C  PT =
VT + T . Because T < (C), we have C < VT + (C). Then the target shareholder with
private valuation (C) must hold the joint rm, i.e., VT + VA + S   C + (C) > ~PJ and
equation (15) (i) holds.
We now assume the condition PA > 2PT . Upon rearranging terms, equation (15) (i) gives
VT =
VT + VA + S   C + (C)
~PJ
C   (C). (34)
Claim 1: The right-hand side of (34), when treating C and  (C) as two independent
variables, strictly decreases in (C).
Claim 1 follows since the derivative of this right-hand side with respect to (C) is
C
~PJ
  1 = 2C   VT   VA   S   J
~PJ
<
2C   VT   VA   A
~PJ
<
2PT   VT   PA
~PJ
<
2PT   PA
~PJ
< 0.
Because (C) > T , (34) together with the claim yield
VT <
VT + VA + S   C + T
~PJ
C   T < C   T ,
or C > VT + T = PT , a contradiction to the premise that C  PT .
We next assume the condition VA > PT  S rather than PA > 2PT . It is straightforward
to show the following:
Claim 2: The expression (VT + VA + S   C +  (C))C, when treating C and  (C) as two
independent variables, increases in C for all C 2 [0; PT ].
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Therefore, (15) (i) yields
VT +  (C) =
VT + VA + S   C +  (C)
~PJ
C  VT + VA + S   PT +  (C)
~PJ
PT
=
VA + S +  (C)  T
~PJ
(VT + T )
 VA + S +  (C)  T
VT + VA + S + T   C
(VT + T ) ,
where the rst inequality follows from Claim 2 and the premise C  PT , and the second
inequality follows from ~PJ  VT +VA+S+min (T ; A) C and T  A. From this, we have
C  VT + VA + S + T  
VT + T
VT +  (C)
(VA + S +  (C)  T )
= PT + ( (C)  T )
VA + S   PT
VT +  (C)
> PT ;
contradicting the premise that C  PT . This completes the proof of the rst statement in
the proposition.
To prove the second statement, examine equation (15) (i):
C = (VT + (C))
~PJ
VT + VA + S   C + (C)  (VT + (C))
VT + VA + S   C + T
VT + VA + S   C + (C)
= (VT + (C))  ((C)  T ) (VT + (C))
VT + VA + S   C +  (C)
 (VT + (C))  VT + (C)
VA + S
((C)  T ) :
Rearranging, we have
C   (VT + (C))   VT + (C)
VA + S
((C)  T )   
VT + 
h
T
VA
 
hT   T

.
Taking limits on both sides yields
lim
VT+
h
T
VA
!0
C   (VT +  (C))  0.
However, because C  (VT + (C)), we also have limVT+hT
VA
!0
C   (VT + (C))  0. Thus,
the relationship must hold as an equality. 
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Proof of Proposition 3: To prove the rst part, note (4) holds with equality. Substituting
for I into (18) and omitting the I index yields the acquiring managers expected per-share
payo¤ in cash acquisition:
EAM () = FT () (VA + S)

VT + VA + S + 
M
A
VT + VA + S + 

+ (1  FT ())
 
VA + 
A
M

. (35)
From equation (19), the acquirer managers per-share expected prot in cash acquisition is
CAM (C)  AM = Pr(C(C)  T ) (VT + S   C) . (36)
This, combined with C  VT + C(C), yields a lower bound on the managers prot:
CAM (C)  AM  Pr(C   VT  T ) (VT + S   C) (37)
= FT (C   VT ) (VT + S   C) . (38)
For any  2 lT ; hT , (35) and (38) yield
CAM(C = VT + )  EAM()  FT ()

MA    
MA   
VT + VA + S + 
(VA + S)

= FT ()
 
MA   
 VT + 
VT + VA + S + 
. (39)
When MA  hT , this expression is nonnegative for all  2

lT ; 
h
T

, and in particular, for
 = (I). Thus, CAM(C = VT + )  EAM (I). As CAM (C)  CAM (C = VT + ), we have
CAM (C
)  EAM (I). This proves the rst part. To prove the second part, note under con-
dition (b) of this part, (39) holds with equality. Further, under condition (a) of this part, the
right-hand side of (39) is non-positive. In addition, the inequality in (4) implies (35) holds
with an inequality. Following the logic in the proof of the rst part establishes the result. 
Proof of Proposition 4: Follows from Propositions 1 and 2. 
Proof of Proposition 5: Part (i) follows from Proposition 4 (i) and Proposition 6 (i).
To show part (ii), note the marginal holder of the joint rm in a cash o¤er has a private
valuation of at least A, the price of the joint rm satises
~PJ  VA + VT + S   C + A = PA + VT + S   C.
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By (36), we have
VT + S   C > 0.
Combining these inequalities yields ~PJ > PA. 
Proof of Proposition 6: We rst prove part (i). We start by identifying situations in
which the conditions in part (i) are satised and an equilibrium equity o¤er is made.
Claim 1: The acquirer manager is strictly better o¤er in an optimal equity o¤er if
S >
VT + S + 
h
T
VT + VA + S + MA
MA +
VA
VT + VA + S + MA
hT . (40)
To prove the claim, note that for all  2 lT ; hT , by (4), we have
EAM (I ())  AM  FT ()

S +
MA   
VT + VA + S + 
(VA + S)  MA

= FT ()
"
VT + VA + S + 
M
A
VT + VA + S + 
S +
 
MA   

VA
VT + VA + S + 
  MA
#
= FT ()

VT + VA + S + 
M
A
VT + VA + S + 
S   VT + S + 
VT + VA + S + 
MA  
VA
VT + VA + S + 


= FT ()
VT + VA + S + 
M
A
VT + VA + S + 

S   VT + S + 
VT + VA + S + MA
MA  
VA
VT + VA + S + MA


.
(41)
Note that if (40) holds, then, for   1
2
lT +
1
2
hT , we have, using (41), that 
E
AM (I (
))  
AM > 0. As EAM (I
)  EAM (I ()), it follows that EAM (I) > AM .
Next, consider a case in which A = T  . Consider the limiting case in which hT is
arbitrarily close to . Then the RHS of (40) approaches
VT + S + 
VT + VA + S + MA
MA +
VA
VT + VA + S + MA
 =
(VT + S) 
M
A + 
M
A + VA
VT + VA + S + MA
<
(VT + S) + 
M
A + VA
VT + VA + S + MA
= .
It then follows that there exists S > 0 such that the RHS of (40) < S < . In light of Claim
1, an equity o¤er can be made that maximizes and strictly increases the payo¤ of the ac-
quirers management. Furthermore, in light of Proposition 3, the equity o¤er is preferred to
a cash o¤er. This establishes the existence result. By (3) and (9), part (i) of the proposition
follows. Part (ii) follows from Proposition 4 (ii) and Proposition 5 (ii). 
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Proof of Proposition 7: Follows from the same arguments as for Result 5. 
Proof of Result 6: Assume that A  T (the proof follows similarly if A < T ). Then
(20) and (21) yield
1  2  I
I + 1
Z 1
A
AdLA (A) +
1
I + 1
Z 1
T
TdLT (T )  I (A   T )
I + 1
=
I
I + 1
Z 1
A
(A   A) dLA (A) +
1
I + 1
Z 1
T
(T   T ) dLT (T ) + T .
Next, 2  0 yields 1  2
 I
I + 1
Z 1
A
(A   A) dLA (A) +
1
I + 1
Z 1
T
(T   T ) dLT (T ) +
IA
I + 1
+
T
I + 1
 I
I + 1
Z 1
A
(A   A) dLA (A) +
1
I + 1
Z 1
T
(T   T ) dLT (T ) + max fA; Tg .
Plugging the above into (22) establishes the result. 
Proof of Result 7: Follows directly from Result 6 and (25). 
Proof of Proposition 8: A target shareholder with private valuation  accepts cash o¤er
C if and only if C  VT + . The probability o¤er C is accepted is
Pr (C) =
8><>:
1 if C VT (^ )
2
> 1
C VT (^ )
2
if 0 < C VT (^ )
2
 1
0 if C VT (^ )
2
 0:
We focus on o¤ers where C 2 [VT + ^  ; VT + ^+ ]. As a function of C, the expected
payo¤ of the acquiring rms management is:
A = Pr (C) (VT + S   C) +
 
VA + 
M
A

=
C   VT   ^+ 
2
(VT + S   C) + VA + MA :
Di¤erentiating with respect to C yields the rst-order condition:
dA
dC
= 0 =
S + ^+ 2VT     2C
2
: (42)
Since the second-order conditions are satised, (42) denes a global maximum. In addition,
if the optimal o¤er C exceeds VT + ^ , the o¤er must be individually rational because the
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acquiring rm could always o¤er C = VT + ^    and have its o¤er be rejected. Allowing
for a boundary solution, the general solution for the optimal o¤er C is
C =
8<:
no o¤er if S < ^  
VT +
S+^ 
2
if ^   < S < ^+ 3
VT + ^+  if S  ^+ 3:
(43)
We then solve for how the synergies and degree of uncertainty faced by the acquiring
rm a¤ect the equilibrium likelihood of a successful takeover. Substituting for C yields
Pr (C) =
8<:
0 if S  ^   (i)
S ^+
4
if ^   < S < ^+ 3 (ii)
1 if S  ^+ 3: (iii)
(44)
The results now follow directly from equations (43) and (44). Note that the condition
in the third bullet of the proposition is S < ^, which di¤ers from the condition S < ^+ 3,
as in the second line of equation (43) because in the proposition we consider what happens
when  increases from zero. 
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